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ABSTRACT: A high-profile debate is taking place in China concerning the 
organization of agricultural land and production, with profound implications 
for China's countryside. This debate is between those advocating for 
agricultural production to be taken over by large-scale agribusinesses, and 
those against this. Proponents regard agribusinesses as embodying modernity 
and progress, while those against forewarn of the channeling of profits out of 
peasant hands, the loss of peasants' autonomy over labor and land, and the 
destruction of rural life. Recent English language publications on China's 
agrarian change highlight the growing power of agribusiness and related 
processes of depeasantization, implying the Chinese debate on “who will till 
the land?” is futile. But this view obscures efforts by Chinese scholars and 
policymakers to promote forms of agricultural organization conducive to 
maintaining peasant livelihoods. By examining the Chinese debates on 
agribusinesses, family farms, and cooperatives, this article highlights points of 
contestation among policymakers and alternative possibilities, which may yet 
shape the course of China's agrarian change. This article contributes to 
scholarship on China's agrarian change, broader questions concerning 
depeasantization, and developmental possibilities under collective ownership. 
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Introduction 
 
In five or ten years' time, who will till China's land? How will they till the land? Will it in fact be capitalist 
large-scale corporate enterprises of hired labor? Or peasant cooperatives developed on the basis of peasant 
household enterprises, implementing socialized services? At the moment, we are in a period of carefully 
considering this question.
1
  
  
 
Over the last several years the organization of agricultural land and production in China has 
been widely debated, with profound implications for the development of the countryside and 
the people living there. This debate over “who will till the land?” (shui lai zhongdi?) has 
taken place in policy and academic journals, in online forums, and at all levels of 
government.  The debate, which is highly complex, is between those advocating for 
agricultural production to be taken over by large-scale agribusinesses, and those against this.2 
                                                 
1Chen Xiwen, quoted in He 2013. 
2 There is more than one way to categorize the positions in this debate. In my interpretation, the key division is 
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Proponents regard agribusinesses as embodying modernity, progress, efficiency, 
competitiveness, and profitability. Their opponents warn against   the channeling of 
agricultural profits out of peasant hands, loss of autonomy over their labor, loss of their land, 
and, ultimately, the wholesale destruction of rural life.  
 Yet, as this debate has been proceeding, a substantial and surprisingly coherent body 
of scholarship has emerged in English language publications which highlights the growing 
power of agribusiness and implies that the Chinese debate is futile and detached from reality. 
It does this in four ways. First, it identifies large-scale agribusiness as the government's 
favored mode of agricultural modernization.3 Second, it points to a growing trend of arable 
land being taken over by agribusinesses.4 Third, it highlights processes whereby indigenous 
alternatives are failing to take hold, or gradually being subsumed to – or displaced by – large-
scale corporations.5 Fourth, it illuminates how processes separating peasants from their land 
and livelihoods are already well underway.6  
 This scholarship emerges, in part, in response to earlier claims that processes of 
proletarianization, or depeasantization, have not occurred as expected in China's countryside.7 
The picture presented is compelling, as it coheres with Eurocentric assumptions about the 
inevitable disappearance of the peasantry with the development of capitalist relations.8 If this 
is the case, however, what is the point of this ongoing Chinese debate on agricultural 
production? If the triumph of agribusiness is a foregone conclusion, why does this debate 
continue to percolate within China, and does it actually matter? 
  In fact, the perspective set out above provides only a partial view, obscuring the 
important ways in which the question of agricultural organization continues to be contested at 
the highest levels of policymaking within the PRC.9 Of all the scholars and local officials I 
interviewed in preparation for this article, none agreed that large-scale agribusiness was 
considered by the central government to be the driving force of agricultural modernization. 
On the contrary, the hopes placed in it appear to be falling short of expectations. A recent 
report by the Development Research Centre of the State Council argued, “compared with 
corporate farms...family farms enjoy economic management efficiency[.] We should stick to 
the building of family farms, but not corporate farms, as the major mode for future 
agricultural management.”10  
In this article I draw attention to how the main alternative forms of agricultural 
organization promoted by the central government -- family farms and cooperatives -- 
continue to feature strongly in policymakers' plans for rural development. This is rooted in 
the knowledge that China's vast peasantry, currently consisting of over 200 million small 
farms, has a long future ahead of it.11 I demonstrate this by providing a historically embedded 
                                                                                                                                                        
whether the profits of production flow primarily into the hands of local peasant producers, or are extracted by 
incoming corporations.  
3 Schneider 2017, 6; Luo, Andreas and Li 2017, 27; Gong and Zhang 2017. 
4 Ye 2015, 327; Yan and Chen 2015, 376; Luo, Andreas, and Li 2017, 29; Zhan 2017, 28; Schneider 2017, 9; 
Gong and Zhang 2017. 
5 Yan and Chen 2015, 379; Huang 2015; Hu, Zhang, and Donaldson 2017. 
6  Chuang 2014; Yan and Chen 2015, 388; Andreas and Zhan 2016; Huang 2015. 
7  Zhang and Donaldson 2008, 44; Post 2008, 324; Huang, Yuan and Peng 2012. 
8  “The Western view, and especially the agricultural paradigm entailed in it, is strongly based on linearity: that 
history only proceeds in one direction.” Ploeg and Ye 2016, 10. 
9 Gao 2017, 40. 
10  Zhang 2016.  
11 Ploeg and Ye 2016, 1. 
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and empirically grounded analysis of the political thought, core issues, and argumentative 
strategies deployed by Chinese policymakers and scholars in this debate. The article 
contributes to the burgeoning scholarship on China's agrarian change. It also speaks to the 
still unresolved question of depeasantization in China, and raises questions about the 
possibilities for economic development rooted in collective ownership.  
 From 2013 until 2016 I held a postdoctoral position at a leading research institute in 
Beijing, where I conversed frequently with those involved in the debate over agricultural 
production. I conducted formal interviews, attended lectures and public talks by leading 
scholars and policymakers in the field, and undertook two fieldwork trips to Chengdu, in July 
2015 and May 2017. There, I interviewed and conversed with officials from the Agricultural 
Affairs Commission of the Chengdu Municipal Government, and visited several villages 
where I conducted further interviews with local officials and villagers involved in land 
transfer schemes. I have combined this field research with a broad range of textual analysis of 
Chinese government policy documents and articles in academic journals and Chinese 
newspapers.  
 The article is organized into two parts. In part one I lay out the historical and political 
background of this debate. First, I show how it emerged out of earlier debates on China's rural 
land ownership. The fact that China's rural land continues to be collectively owned has 
confounded the expectations of many observers. Indeed, China's developmental trajectory has 
routinely defied Eurocentric predictions, particularly regarding rural land organization and its 
social effects. Second, I locate the question of land ownership in a world historical context. 
Once embedded within a world market, private small-holders are often unable to sustain their 
livelihoods and are severed from their land. This issue is of ongoing concern to Chinese 
leaders and continues to shape policymaking towards the countryside. Third, I discuss how 
China's peasants have maintained their land through collective ownership, which has enabled 
mass migration into cities without the extent of land loss that many predicted. This form of 
collective ownership, nevertheless, impeded productivity and capital accumulation, problems 
which became increasingly urgent over time. Fourth, I discuss how problems associated with 
arable land organization led to the formal approval of land transfers, rather than privatization. 
This created an arable land market under collective ownership – intended to safeguard 
peasants' access to their land, while promoting development.   
In part two, I examine the debates on land transfers, with respect to agribusiness, family 
farms, and cooperatives. First, many policymakers view agribusinesses as the solution to 
modernizing China’s countryside. However, while there is some consensus concerning the 
role of corporations linking small producers with supply chains, there is controversy over 
agribusinesses taking over arable land, and the entry of urban industrial capital into 
agriculture. Those opposing warn of the loss of arable land, and the degradation of peasant 
livelihoods. Second, I examine an emerging body of English language literature which, 
similarly, identifies a new form of enclosure movement. While this literature provides crucial 
insights, I raise questions about the coherence of the narrative collectively suggested, 
particularly regarding the future of agribusiness in China. In the final two sections, I examine 
debates on family farms and cooperatives, challenging the notion of a unified, fixed state 
vision for the countryside. On the question of family farms, I point to disagreements among 
policymakers on whether “bigger is better.”  In contrast, I suggest a more egalitarian 
arrangement of smaller, family-run organizations may yet emerge. On cooperatives, in 
contrast to more pessimistic accounts, I highlight ongoing efforts within China to explore 
viable forms of cooperative organization. Despite the numerous failed cases to date, I point to 
how recent successes continue to spur hope for a future role of cooperatives in China's 
development. I conclude by suggesting that the urge to identify a “grand narrative” of China's 
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agrarian change is best resisted.12 
 
I. The land privatization problem 
  
Many outside observers of China, particularly Anglo-American scholars and journalists, have 
assumed China will, or should, follow European histories of capitalist development, and are 
baffled or critical when it does not. Most notably, since reforms began in 1978 the Chinese 
government has continually thwarted the hopes and expectations of many by its refusal to 
conform to the neoliberal or Washington Consensus models of development by privatizing 
rural land. This is incongruous with the belief that private property is necessary for 
development, namely that “secure, private, and formal tenure are imperative for stable, 
economic growth.”13 Indeed, the notion of the immanence of private property to development 
transcends the current moment of neoliberal hegemony. It underpins the dominant 
modernization paradigm derived from both liberal and Marxist thought, famously narrated in 
Marx's account of the English enclosure movement, according to which the peasants are 
severed from their land through processes of commercialization and privatization, and forced 
onto the labor market to form a proletariat. In recent decades, therefore, China's rapid growth 
and integration into the global capitalist economy, without the implementation of private land 
rights in the countryside and the ensuing mass proletarianization of the peasantry, has posed a 
conundrum.14  
 Indeed, the assumption that China is ultimately destined to replicate European 
historical trajectories rooted in private landed property has led to a number of skewed 
interpretations or inaccurate predictions. Some scholars on the left, witnessing primitive 
accumulation in the form of land grabs by local officials in league with developers, and 
accompanying rural-urban migration on a mass scale, presupposed a rerun of capitalist 
histories involving the peasantry's mass expulsion from the land.15 Such analyses, while 
compelling at the time, neglected the crucial fact that, despite the many traumatic 
dispossessions that have taken place, due to the overall maintenance of collective land rights 
in the countryside, the vast majority of peasants have kept their land, and thus “[a]n army of 
landless vagabonds has not emerged.”16 China's development path has thus appeared 
somehow warped or distorted, the assumed proper trajectory of mass proletarianization 
seeming “partial,” “unfinished,” or “incomplete,” the assumption being that we, as China 
scholars, know where it is going -, or at least should be going.17 
 Meanwhile, the non-commodified nature of rural land and the lack of social 
differentiation of rural producers appeared to demonstrate  that “the Chinese countryside 
remains decidedly non-capitalist.”18 On the neoliberal right, the lack of private property was 
regarded as an irrational hindrance to full market relations commensurate with rural 
modernity.19 When the PRC Property Law was passed in March 2007, the first piece of 
                                                 
12Gao 2017, 40. 
13As discussed by Ho 2013, 1090. 
14Debates over the question of China’s land privatization flourished in Chinese policymaking circles since the 
1990s, see, Qin 2003; Wen 2007; Zhang and Donaldson 2013; Gao 2017, 35-7. 
15“[T]his modern version of primitive accumulation...amounts to the greatest enclosure movement in 
history...And, as in the past, this process is hothousing the emergence of a class of newly rich capitalists, side-
by-side with growing millions of unemployed and starving.” Smith and Holmstrom 2000; see also Walker and 
Buck 2007, 42. 
16Zhang and Donaldson 2008, 44. See also Post 2008, 324; Huang, Yuan and Peng 2012, 164-5. 
17Pun and Lu 2010; Webber 2008, 302. 
18Post 2008, 324. Also: ““[c]apitalist agriculture” as usually understood accounts for only a very small portion 
of Chinese agriculture today[.]” Huang, Yuan and Peng 2012, 167-8. 
19Prosterman 2003; Saich 2007. 
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legislation since 1949 to enshrine legal protection of private property, many observers were 
bewildered by the Chinese government’s refusal to extend these private property rights to 
rural land.20 This was construed as leaders clinging to outdated socialist ideals or fearing to 
stray too far from the legitimating Communist Party ideology, dubbed “a great missed 
opportunity and a demonstration of Hu Jintao's lack of courage.”21 Again, in 2008, following 
then-President Hu Jintao's much publicized visit to Xiaogang village in Anhui Province, the 
famous symbolic birthplace of the Household Responsibility System that had launched the 
reforms, the story broke in the international media that the Party was about to announce the 
privatization of rural land. The timing of Hu's visit was just prior to the Third Plenary Session 
of the Seventeenth National People's Congress and, for many observers, Hu's speech in 
support of local experimentation with land organization could only mean one thing.22 When 
the anticipated private property reforms failed to materialize yet again, the Third Plenary 
Session was dismissed as an “abortion,”23 a “damp squib,” and a sign of development being 
obstructed once more by China's backward, ideological leaders.24 
 Despite these assumptions, historically the commodification of land has never hinged 
solely on the institution of private property, which is neither sufficient nor strictly necessary.25 
Indeed, the question of how capitalistic forms emerge under collective ownership has long 
been pertinent to China. For Peter Ho, for example, the unclear nature of collective land 
rights has enabled the large-scale appropriation of arable land for urban construction, fueling 
substantial real estate profits and local government revenue, and thus “[p]ut bluntly, the 
flexibility and opacity of China's land markets are perhaps the very drivers of China's 
capitalist development.”26 
 Nevertheless, holding too fast to liberal concepts of development centered on private 
ownership, many failed to recognize the real significance of the rural reforms launched at the 
2008 Third Plenary Session, which formally promoted not privatization, but land transfer, or 
circulation (liuzhuan).27 The significance of this policy in bringing about major social and 
economic transformations in the countryside is now apparent. Before examining this issue, 
the following two sections will discuss the broader historical and political context within 
which the question of China's rural land organization is situated, and the circumstances under 
which land transfer, as opposed to privatization, came about. 
 
World historical context 
 
The promotion of land privatization around the world by free-market institutions such as the 
World Bank and IMF is well-known. But ironically, the strongest impetus for capitalist 
powers last century to promote land privatization came from the need to compete with 
programs distributing land to peasant households implemented by communist movements. 
Despite Mao's association with the People's Communes, the Chinese Communist Party had 
swept to victory in 1949 in just this way. A few decades earlier, the Bolsheviks had likewise 
come to power in Russia by promising land to the peasantry. Throughout the 1950s, most 
famously in Cuba and Vietnam, but also in many parts of Asia, Latin America, and the 
                                                 
20“This latest law...will not bring the full property-rights revolution China's development demands.” The 
Economist 2007. 
21Ford 2007. See also Zhu and Prosterman 2007, 9. 
22Wong, 2008.  
23Liang Jing quoted in Li 2009, 2.  
24The Economist 2008a; The Economist 2008b. 
25Post 2008, 323; Buck and Walker 2007, 45. 
26Ho 2013, 1110. 
27Li 2009, 2; Ye 2015. 
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Middle East, communist movements emphasized rural land redistribution.  For U.S. foreign 
policymakers at that time, the peasants of the world were deemed inherently dangerous, a 
threat to U.S. national interests and the establishment of a liberal, capitalist world order. 
Thus, peasantries were wooed – and militarily coerced – to ally with the capitalist market 
system through competing programs of land distribution to individual households. This took 
place in Taiwan in the 1950s in direct response to the Communist Party's “bloody and 
ineffective” land reforms on the mainland.28 Unlike the egalitarian communist versions, these 
agrarian reforms linked the idealized American-style family plot, liberal economic concepts 
of profit incentive, efficiency, and progress, and the ideals of freedom and democracy, all 
within a market-led framework. While a minority of peasants excelled under these programs, 
the majority were impoverished and dispossessed as the U.S. unloaded its grain surpluses 
onto the world market.29 
 The promotion of land privatization in the developing world continued in the post-
Cold War era. The 1990s saw a renewed orientation by development institutions such as the 
World Bank towards private land entitlements. This occurred in the context of the collapse of 
collectivized agricultural production in the Soviet Union, and was supported by transnational 
agribusinesses desiring secure production arrangements for their subcontracting producers. 
Secure land rights came to be seen as central to the development of market relations.30 Yet, 
ironically, despite the lauding of private property as the guarantor of a secure livelihood, once 
embedded within capitalist market relations the ownership or private tenancy of small 
household farms all too often becomes the route to destitution. As Marx had observed of late-
nineteenth century France after the abolition of serfdom, “what is now ruining the French 
peasant is his small holding itself.”31 Thus, in a process recalling that of nineteenth century 
Europe, commercial food exports resulted in the erosion of small-scale agriculture in the 
southern hemisphere, incapable as it was of competing with large-scale agribusinesses in the 
North. In the name of efficiency, imported grain replaced national self-sufficiency.32 The 
decimation of national agricultures became the means for organizing a new global division of 
labor – a massive transnational army of workers to serve the needs of industrial capital based 
in the North – a process that Farshad Araghi has termed “the great global enclosure of our 
times.”33 The global proletariat which has resulted is manifested by the existence of vast 
slums surrounding the major cities of India, Mexico, Brazil, and elsewhere, which serve as a 
warning for China.34 
 Indeed, the question of China's rural land ownership is not contained within China's 
territorial boundaries, but is subject to the interests of global capital. It is no coincidence that 
Landesa, a Seattle-based advocacy group and one of the foremost international proponents of 
China's rural land privatization, was founded and headed by Roy Prosterman, now Chairman 
Emeritus, one of the architects of U.S. land reform programs in post-colonial countries during 
the Cold War. Advocates of rural land privatization, both within and outside China, thus play 
into the dynamics of a political project geared towards expropriating China's collective 
property in the interests of global private capital.35 When corporate land grabs surged 
following fiscal reforms in the mid-1990s, leading to widespread peasant resistance, many in 
Chinese policy circles believed individualized private property rights would only further 
                                                 
28W.L. 1953.  
29Araghi 2009, 125-9. 
30Akram-Lodhi, Kay and Borras 2009, 221-2. 
31Marx 1937 [1851-2], 63. For contemporary discussions, see Krishna 2004; Akram-Lodhi 2007.  
32McMichael 1997, 642. 
33Araghi 2001; Araghi 2009, 133. See also McMichael 1997, 638; Cammack 2002. 
34Li 2008.  
35Erickson 2008.  
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weaken peasants' bargaining power in the face of corporate might.36 The case against land 
privatization in China, then, rests not on some socialist dogma, but on the historically and 
empirically grounded recognition that once embedded within unequal world market relations, 
land privatization facilitates dispossession. This fact, too little understood by liberal critics 
outside China, has profoundly shaped Chinese policymaking. 
 
The Chinese context 
 
The Chinese peasantry has been largely shielded from these global processes. During the 
Cold War, under Mao Zedong, as America sought to combat the spread of communism 
through the promotion of family farms throughout the Third World, rural land privatization 
came to be understood, unsurprisingly, as explicitly anti-socialist. Thus, once the Chinese 
Communist Party had fully consolidated power, rural production was reorganized 
collectively, culminating in the People's Communes. Following the death of Mao, the 
communes were dismantled and the Household Responsibility System established under 
Deng Xiaoping. Rural land was divided up and parceled out on a household basis. The goal 
was to improve production by allowing full household autonomy.  Yet, to prevent the 
concentration of land in the hands of a wealthy minority, what was parceled out was not 
actual land ownership, but land contract and management rights. Ownership remained 
collective, held by the administrative body of the village committee. Each household could 
organize production on the plots of land contracted to them for a fixed period, after which, 
following demographic changes, the available land would be redistributed anew between 
households on an egalitarian basis. Land could not be bought, sold, or mortgaged and, 
significantly, villagers could not lose their land entitlements through poverty or indebtedness. 
Proletarianization was thus deliberately prevented.  
 The agricultural sector is profoundly important to China's leaders. North American-
trained economists tend to view agricultural land solely in terms of its economic function, but 
in China, it has broader significance, both socially and politically. First, it functions as a 
bottom-line social safety net.37 Peasant households can survive off their land even when faced 
with lack of employment or saddled with debt. This has shielded city governments from the 
obligation of providing welfare and permanent housing for migrant workers or their families 
while avoiding the problem of urban slums. This also lowered the cost of migrant labor, 
enhancing China's appeal to foreign investors. According to Lin Chun, “[t]he enormous yet 
hidden contribution of China’s collective land to global capital and expansion still awaits 
conceptual exposure.”38  
 Second, a healthy agricultural sector is regarded as crucial for national food security. 
A legacy of the Cold War, China's leaders see reliance on foreign imports as leaving the 
country vulnerable both to market fluctuations and possible food embargoes. The central 
government therefore places a high priority on both agricultural productivity and the 
protection of China's scarce arable land. Minimum target levels are set for self-sufficiency in 
grain production and a minimum red line level for arable land has been set at 1.8 billion mu 
(one mu = 0.067 hectares).39  
 Despite its advantages, the Household Responsibility System has shortcomings which 
threaten its ability to fulfill these functions. Plots of land are small, scattered, and unsuited to 
mechanized farming methods.40 Due to the relatively short contract periods (initially five 
                                                 
36Zhang and Donaldson 2013, 264-5; Sargeson 2013. 
37On the social functions of China's agricultural land, see Ploeg, Ye and Pan 2014. 
38Lin 2015, 34. 
39Huang and Yang 2017, 122, 124.  
40It is disputed that large-scale mechanized farming is necessary, or ideal, in the Chinese case. Philip Huang, for 
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years or so), households had little incentive to make long-term investments in their land. It 
was difficult for the small producers to integrate into larger supply chains, and raising income 
levels was not easy. These problems became increasingly urgent from the late 1990s, for the 
following reasons. 
 First, fiscal reforms in 1994 reduced the share of central government funds to the 
localities, imposing on local governments the responsibility for replenishing their own 
budgets. In what became known as the “peasant burden” (nongmin fudan), local governments 
responded by imposing extra taxes and fees, impoverishing peasant households and 
dramatically widening the urban-rural wealth gap. Local governments also turned to land 
conversions as a major source of revenue, turning over large areas of rural land to developers 
for construction purposes, in often illegal but lucrative deals. The result was a surge in land 
grabs and peasant dispossessions, leading to multiple cases of social unrest. Sally Sargeson 
estimates that between 1990 and 2008, 4.2 million hectares were expropriated for urban 
development, and eighty-eight million peasants lost their land.41 By the turn of the century, a  
rural crisis was widely acknowledged in policy circles, expressed as the “three rurals 
problem” (sannong wenti) – reflecting serious concerns related to agricultural production, 
village institutions, and the lives of the peasantry.42  Raising peasants' incomes and improving 
arable land productivity became national priorities. 
 Second, just as the rural crisis was emerging, in 1999 China finally succeeded in 
negotiating its long-awaited entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Recalling the 
devastation of small-holding agriculture in nineteenth century Europe and of developing 
countries in the twentieth century, critics raised concerns that China's small-holding farmers 
were likewise ill-equipped to withstand the international competition.43 Grain from the US 
was well-known to be cheaper and better quality. Proponents, on the other hand, placed hope 
in China's comparative advantage in labor-intensive produce, such as certain vegetables and 
fruits, and the opportunity for importing land-intensive produce at a cheaper price to the 
benefit of China's rural consumers.44 Either way, both positions recognized the need for 
reforming agricultural production.   
Third, China's rapid urbanization has led able-bodied householders, where possible, to 
migrate to find work. This has led to the greyification of the countryside, whereby those left 
on the land typically are the elderly or disabled, and “the general quality of farming has 
deteriorated”.45 The two-fold problem arose of how to attract the most able producers back 
into farming, and how to ensure land was channeled into their hands once they returned. For 
all these reasons, China's policymakers saw an urgent need to restructure arable land 
organization. 
 
Land transfers  
 
Chinese policymakers thus faced a dilemma. On the one hand, many rejected rural land 
privatization on the grounds that it would lead to large numbers of landless peasants and the 
development of lawless slums around cities. On the other hand, the agricultural sector 
organized under collective ownership was urgently in need of reform. This led to an impasse 
in policymaking circles over the question of land ownership. Various experiments in land 
                                                                                                                                                        
example, argues that China's small-scale agriculture is better suited to the labor-intensive produce of vegetables, 
fruit, livestock, poultry and fish, see Huang 2011.  
41Sargeson 2013, 1068. 
42Li  2003. 
43Wen 1999. 
44Lin 2004. 
45Ye 2016, 5. 
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organization and production were explored in an attempt to resolve this problem.46 First, the 
much-hated Agricultural Tax was abolished in 2006, marking a major policy shift from 
taxation to various agricultural subsidies.47 These, which include direct subsidies to farmers 
and minimum procurement prices, have played an important role in protecting Chinese 
agriculture following WTO entry.48 They can only go so far, however, as they threaten to 
conflict with China's WTO agreements.49 Second, informal leasing of agricultural plots 
between householders became widespread, freeing up some villagers to find off-farm work 
and enabling remaining households to scale-up cultivatable land. Third, in the latter half of 
the 1990s, the central government began to promote agricultural industrialization, or the 
vertical integration (chanyehua) of agriculture. Household farmers were encouraged to work 
with a variety of larger organizations such as agribusinesses and cooperatives. This linked  
them with  a comprehensive system including transportation, storage, processing, marketing, 
and distribution. This has enabled small-scale producers to integrate into wider markets, both 
domestic and international.50  
 On the basis of such experiments, China’s leaders shrewdly sidestepped the thorny 
issue of rural land privatization. Instead, the key document released at the Third Plenary 
Session of October 2008 formally approved the practice of land transfer.51 According to  
Chen Xiwen, leader of the Central Committee Leading Small Group on Rural Work and one 
of the key drafters of this resolution, this signified a shift in policy focus from land ownership 
to land usage, effectively relegating the question of ownership to the back burner.52 
Agricultural land remains collectively owned and contracted (chengbao) to each household, 
while  use-rights  (jingyingquan) are transferrable on a contractual basis. The goal is to 
concentrate land in the hands of the most able producers, and raise the scale of production, 
thereby facilitating the use of agricultural technology and lowering production costs. This 
frees surplus rural labor to seek off-farm employment, while village households are still able 
to gain a minimal income from their land allotment. In this way, the Chinese government 
seeks to solve the twofold problem of how to create a land market without private 
ownership,53 and how to free up rural labor without permanently severing peasants from their 
land.  
 This has led to the current policy debates: to whom should the land be transferred? A 
debate on cooperatives as an alternative to agribusiness has been around for more than a 
decade, since the passing of the Law on Specialized Farmer-Cooperatives in 2006.54 In the 
No. 1 Document of 2013, the central government introduced the concept of “new subjects of 
production management” (xinxing shengchan jingying zhuti) into state policy discourse, 
broadening the forms officially promoted to include family farms (jiating nongchang) and 
other smaller entities, alongside agribusiness and cooperatives, giving new impetus to the 
debate.55 By June 2016, the People's Daily reported that over one third of China's cultivated 
                                                 
46On the evolution of China's land transfer policies since the 1980s, see Ye 2015, 324-7. 
47Huang and Yang 2017. 
48Grains, and labor-intensive products in which China has a comparative advantage, have largely withstood 
international competition. Imports of land-intensive products have increased, however, and China's soybean 
sector has been hit hard. Yan, Chen and Ku 2016. 
49Wilson 2016. 
50Niu 2002.  
51PRC 2008. 
52Jinrong Jie [Finance World] 2008.  
53In practice, perhaps better described as a “quasi-market” given the complex localized social and political 
relations in which it is embedded. Zhang 2015, 352. 
54Day 2008; Huang 2011. 
55State Council 2012. The No. 1 Document indicates the policy document of highest priority. 
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land, 460 million mu, had been transferred to over 2.7 million “new subjects.”56  
 Paradoxically, although land transfers are intended to safeguard peasants' land rights, 
the same set of problems that have long been associated with privatization appear to be 
emerging. According to Yan Hairong and Chen Yiyuan, “the collective ownership of farmland 
has been rendered increasingly hollow.”57 For Mobo Gao, land transfers constitute an attempt 
“to privatize land in China surreptitiously, step by step.”58 Despite the continuation of 
collective ownership, then, are these new market relations nevertheless bringing about the 
gradual destruction of peasant livelihoods, and are we witnessing a new form of enclosure 
movement?  
 
II. Large-Scale Agribusiness  
 
Agribusiness corporations are typically presented by their proponents as the bringers of 
modernity, progress, technology, and capital to an otherwise outmoded, scattered, parochial, 
and inefficient system of household agriculture.59 Sometimes called the “American model” 
(meiguo moshi), advocates of large-scale agribusiness draw attention to their role in 
promoting development in the advanced capitalist countries, implying that they are part of a 
world historical trend.60 Since the late 1990s, the central has bestowed selected Chinese 
agribusinesses with the title “dragon-head enterprise” (longtou qiye) providing them with 
state support, such as special financing and tax incentives.61  Originally, a dragon-head's role 
was to achieve the vertical integration of farm households by leading – in the form of a 
traditional Chinese dragon dance – a large number of small-scale farmers into the wider 
market, and onwards towards industrialization and modernization.62 In practice, however, the 
relationship between dragon-heads and villagers varies by degrees, ranging from the 
contracting out of production, to the direct leasing of land and employment of fully 
proletarianized agricultural workers on large farms.63 In 2013, the central government 
expanded the possibilities for outside capital to enter the countryside, advocating in the 
Numbero 1 Document the “encouragement and introduction of urban industrial-commercial 
capital into the countryside, to develop planting and husbandry suited to corporatized 
operations”, widely interpreted as a sign of encouragement for agribusinesses – whether 
dragon-head or not – to take over direct management of agricultural land.64  
 While there is more of a consensus in policymaking circles about the contribution 
corporations can provide in areas such as processing and marketing, the direct leasing and 
management of agricultural land by agribusinesses is controversial. The sensitivity of this 
issue prompted a fierce debate between 2010 and 2012 in academic journals, newspapers, and 
online forums. At that point, rather than taking a public position, the Chinese government set 
up a number of pilot programs, apparently adopting a wait-and-see stance, and the discussion 
has since continued largely behind closed doors at the top levels of government.65  
 There are two major points of dispute. The first concerns the degradation of the 
peasantry as a class, with those opposed to the entry of industrial-commercial capital into the 
                                                 
56Gao 2016. 
57Yan and Chen 2015, 375. 
58Gao 2017, 39.  
59Wen 2000.  
60Feng 2001; Zhang 2000.  
61Waldron, Brown and Longworth 2006. 
62Schneider 2017, 7.  
63Zhang and Donaldson 2008.  
64Lu and Li 2015. 
65Interview with Wang Yahua, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, June 3, 
2015. 
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countryside warning of a European-style enclosure movement and the reproduction of 
capitalist class relations in the countryside. They argue that disorganized household farmers 
with little comparative bargaining power, in the face of government-backed corporate might, 
will forfeit their rights to autonomous production, be driven from their land, and relegated to 
the ranks of hired laborers.66 The second concerns land usage. While there is limited  profit in 
commercial agricultural production, there is every incentive for urban capital to use China's 
scarce rural land for non-agricultural purposes, raising the threat of food insecurity.67 Hence, 
the phrase “agricultural land for agricultural use” (nongdi nongyong) is frequently cited in 
policy discussions, and a number of local officials I interviewed in Chengdu confidently 
assured me that satellite surveillance imagery would prevent land mis-use.68 Nevertheless, the 
problem is all too real. One prominently reported case, for example, involved real-estate 
corporations registering as eco-agriculture or tourist agriculture companies to gain access to 
farmland, on which they built hundreds of luxury villas, with the cooperation of local 
officials.69 The problem then is not so much the regulatory safeguards in place to prevent 
such abuses, but the levels of corruption by which such regulations can be bypassed. Indeed, 
both of the above concerns are exacerbated as officials' track records continue to be evaluated 
on the basis of how much capital they bring into the countryside. This encourages and 
facilitates corrupt alliances between rural cadres, agribusiness, and urban capital to the 
detriment of the peasantry and local agriculture, and begins to resemble an enclosure 
movement in its classic form.70  
 
A new enclosure movement? 
 
Recent English language scholarship has strongly illuminated these issues, with the 
emergence of a substantial body of literature providing empirical research on the social 
problems arising as agribusinesses have taken hold. An important intervention came in 2015 
with a special issue on China in the Journal of Agrarian Change. The editors observed a new 
form of enclosure movement – instead of the land grabs which ravaged the countryside from 
the 1990s, the entry of large capital into the countryside in the form of agribusiness, backed 
by preferential state policies, obviated direct expropriation: “[capital now…can use its market 
power to eliminate all other alternatives in which rural residents can use their land 
productively and, thus, leave them with no choice but to part with their land in a fire sale 
manner.”71 In a case study of aquaculture in Guangdong, Yu Huang demonstrated how 
agribusiness outcompeted shrimp farmers by taking advantage of the high price of off-season 
farming, gradually taking over the full production process, first processing and marketing, 
credits and inputs, and finally the land, with the once autonomous farmers bankrupted and 
fully proletarianized. Thus, she observed, “land [is] transformed from a support for 
subsistence to an instrument for profit.”72  
 Other studies have examined alliances between agrarian capital and local officials, 
with accounts of the coercive (if non-violent) methods used by cadres to compel unwilling 
villagers to transfer their land to agribusinesses.73 Scholars of hukou reform identify a 
tripartite alliance between agrarian capital, local officials, and the urban real estate industry. 
                                                 
66Chen Xiwen, reported in Gongchan Dangyuan [Communist Party Member] 2010; see also He 2013. 
67Yu 2011.   
68Interviews conducted between July 16-21, 2015. 
69Zhang 2013, 40. 
70Li 2013.  
71Zhang, Oya and Ye 2015, 307.  
72Huang 2015, 401. 
73Luo, Andreas, and Yao 2017; Gong and Zhang 2017. 
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This alliance shifts peasants off their land and into cities, simultaneously fueling the housing 
market and making rural land available for the consolidated production required by 
agribusinesses.74  
 These studies provide crucial insights into China's agrarian change. However, the 
perspective they collectively provide is only partial. While agribusinesses have been taking 
over the management of increasing areas of land, empirical data is limited, and a recent 
survey estimated that only 3.5 per cent of arable land has been transferred from small 
households to agribusinesses.75 Moreover, it is unclear how far this trend will proceed. First, 
while the wide, flat plains of the Northeast are ideal for the levels of scaling-up required by 
agribusiness, much of China's arable land is in mountainous or uneven areas.76 Second is the 
question of labor productivity. According to leading agricultural economist Huang Jikun, 
hired laborers used part-time by large-scale agribusinesses often lack motivation. Supervision 
is not easy with many laborers on large areas of land, and this has impacted the quality of 
harvests.77 Third is the ending of the temporary grain procurement program. Implemented in 
2004 to maintain farmers' incomes and domestic grain security, grain procurement prices 
were up to fifty per cent above market rate. These policies attracted many incoming 
agribusinesses, but have been phased out in recent years, with the end of corn subsidies 
announced in March 2016, causing many companies to pull production.78 Thus, the future of 
agribusinesses directly managing land in China is uncertain.79  
 
Family farms 
 
Despite its apparent association with the household farm of the household responsibility 
system, the term “family farm” (jiating nongchang ) is new to China’s high-level policy 
discourse. It first came to official prominence in 2013 as one of the “new subjects of 
agricultural production” and represents a significant shift in Chinese policy thinking.80 While 
the term’s usage differs between localities, it refers to a successful farm household that has 
taken over the management of land from neighboring households and has achieved a size of 
of at least fifty mu. At that point the household can register with the local government to be 
officially certified as a family farm.81 Policy documents emphasize agricultural land use, 
agriculture as the primary source of income, profit as the primary goal, and family members 
as the main source of labor. According to official data, as of 2013 China had 877,000 family 
farms, occupying an estimated 13.4 per cent of cultivated contract land.82 
 As with the discourse surrounding corporate enterprises, efforts have been made to 
align the Chinese family farm with world development, in particular with the family farms of 
                                                 
74Chuang 2014; Andreas and Zhan 2016; Zhan 2017. 
75Ji et al. 2016, 54. Cf. Yan and and Chen 2015, 376. 
76Ji et al. 2016, 50-1; Gao 2017, 37. 
77Interview with Huang Jikun, China Center for Agricultural Policy, Peking University, May 16, 2017. The 
question arises as to what extent the shirking of labor on agribusiness farms is an act of resistance by local 
employees deprived of their own autonomy over production. 
78Stanway 2016. 
79Interview with Zhang Yinghong, Ministry of Agriculture Research Centre for the Rural Economy, Beijing, 
May 9, 2017.  
80For a history of family or tenant farms in China since the 1980s, see Yan and Chen 2015, 382-6.  
81Qian Forrest Zhang identifies “politically assisted accumulation”, an alternative trajectory whereby farmers are 
politically connected cadres or entrepreneurs able to leverage their relationships to gain favorable benefits and 
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early American capitalism, as well as those of Europe, and Japan.83 This denotes an important 
change from the policy discourses on household production in the 1980s. The latter, 
following the dismantling of the commune system, emphasized individual household 
autonomy within a collective ownership system organized on an egalitarian basis, as a new 
and improved form of socialism.84 The family farm of current policy discourse, on the other 
hand, is associated with agricultural entrepreneurs succeeding due to their superior 
capabilities. Indeed, jiating nongchang is a direct translation of the English term “family 
farm,” the concept deployed by U.S. policymakers as the rural liberal-capitalist (and anti-
socialist) ideal during the Cold War, deemed necessary for the modernization of peasant 
societies. 
 This deliberate association does not mean that those promoting family farms in China 
are advocating for Euro-American developmental forms involving large-scale private land 
enclosures. Instead, family farms have been explicitly pitched in policy discussions against 
commercial corporations. Chen Xiwen, for example, advocated family farms over 
agribusiness on the grounds that the latter tend towards too large a scale, depriving villagers 
of  access to their land and, in many cases, failing to provide local villagers with 
employment.85 Thus, the purposeful association with American  family farms is  a strategic 
attempt by policymakers to re-articulate household production as a universal historical aspect  
of rural modernity and  to defang the claims made on behalf of big capital that the household 
farm is a backward social form. At the same time, this also undermines claims made by those 
advocating for an “American model” based on industrial-commercial corporations. Family 
farm advocates instead seek to preserve agricultural capital within the countryside, for the 
benefit of peasants.  
 In English language publications, family farms have been associated with 
agribusinesses on the grounds they are market dependent, embedded in commodity relations, 
and aim towards expanding production.86 On the other hand, two land-related paths are 
identified by which family farms are vulnerable to displacement by agribusinesses. First, in 
competition for land access, they are disadvantaged compared to outside capital which is 
“both bigger and more able to mobilize higher-level political power,” and second, they are 
disadvantaged due to scale-biased government policies which determine subsidies on the 
basis of cultivated land area.87 However, it is not a foregone conclusion that family farms will 
continue to seek expansion and therefore behave no differently from corporations. In fact, 
there is an ongoing policy debate concerning the “appropriate scale” (shidu guimo) of farm 
size and the paradigm of “bigger is better.”88 Empirical research by Chinese scholars into the 
effects of farm size show that farms in other parts of Asia have been declining over time, 
despite – as in the cases of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – state policies oriented towards 
scaling-up.89 Surveys of rice, maize, and wheat farms in China over the past decade  
demonstrate a rise in productivity corresponding to increased farm size up to about 100 mu, 
after which the productivity-to-cost ratio declines. While results depend in part on the type of 
crop under cultivation, the regional topography, and access to machinery and other services, 
the trend is clear.90 Evidently, farms run by smaller numbers of trusted family members, 
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dedicated full-time to their own land, are more cost-effective. This finding also has social 
implications. A larger number of smaller family farms will provide full-time employment for 
a greater number of householders, avoiding problems such as drug-use, petty crime, and 
gambling, which have been increasing in some villages where employment opportunities are 
scarce or sporadic. Maintaining householders' access to land also safeguards its function as a 
social safety net.91 Consequently, central government policymakers are currently considering 
the readjustment of subsidy policies to discourage farmers from expanding their acreage 
above a certain limit.92  
 
Cooperatives 
 
The promoting of cooperatives during the reform era took off with the emergence of the New 
Rural Reconstruction Movement (NRRM), a group of primarily urban scholars and activists 
who  sought to encourage  economic cooperation between smallholders.93 Localized 
experiments pioneered and coordinated by the movement’s members led to certain models 
receiving government funding, and the cooperative being adopted as part of the central 
government’s campaign to “build a new socialist countryside” launched in 2006. According 
to official figures, registered peasant cooperatives surpassed 1.5 million in 2016,94 although 
only a only small fraction involve arable land transfers, and the total area under direct 
management by cooperatives may be less than one per cent.95  
 The core advantage of the cooperative is that members are remunerated with a portion 
of overall profits in proportion to their own inputs, providing a better deal economically than 
they would get from a fully commercialized corporation. The NRRM regards cooperatives as 
the bedrock of an alternative national path of development that challenges the dominant 
neoliberal model centered on the private accumulation of capital. For government 
policymakers and rural cadres, on the other hand, the role of cooperatives is localized and 
specific – to raise the incomes of poorer peasants, particularly those in geographically 
disadvantaged regions beyond the reach of urban-rural integration, spurned by both 
agribusinesses and urban capital. Alternative state strategies that have aimed to solve the 
problem of such populations by shifting them off the land and into cities are proving 
problematic.96  
 Formed, at least initially, by the vertical integration of small farms, many cooperatives 
preserve the household form of production which, according to a number of rural scholars, is 
more efficient in China – with its high population-to-land area ratio – than large, mechanized 
farms.97 On this basis, some proponents of cooperatives assert the existence of different 
Western and Eastern agricultural forms – the former characterized by largescale farms, the 
latter by household production. Identifying a distinct East Asian model, they point to the 
agricultural policies of South Korea and Taiwan, and the “Japanese model” (riben moshi) in 
particular, as more appropriate for China.98 Wen Tiejun, perhaps the most well-known 
member of the movement, has commended the Japanese government for giving preferential 
treatment to cooperatives while strictly prohibiting private or foreign capital from entering 
the countryside, thus guaranteeing that a high proportion of the economic gains produced 
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remain in the countryside.99  
 The invoking of an East Asian model is also strategic. For example, according to one 
high-level cadre I interviewed in July 2015, villagers frequently express reluctance to joining 
cooperatives, associating them with Maoist communes. They opt instead to transfer their land 
to agribusinesses, which they view as modern, despite the prospect of lower income.100 The 
promotion of an East Asian model serves to reframe the cooperative as a culturally distinct 
but equally modern alternative. From the numerous mentions of Taiwan and Japan by 
cooperative members I interviewed in May 2017, it appears that, at least in some areas, the 
idea of the East Asian model as a viable developmental form has taken hold at the 
grassroots.101 
 Recent accounts of cooperatives in English language scholarship are pessimistic. For 
Yan and Chen, for example, once embedded within unequal market relations, the labor of 
cooperative members often becomes subsumed to more powerful capitalist entities “leading 
to small producers' further marginalization and vulnerability.”102 Furthermore, a  survey of 
fifty “cooperatives” by Hu, Zhang and Donaldson found that only two were genuine and still 
functioning.103 Of the rest, fifteen were shells set up to take advantage of state subsidies; 
twenty-nine were de facto agribusinesses, maintaining only a commercial relationship with 
members; and the others had been fully commercialized or gone bankrupt.   
 Yet, the cumulative effect of scholarship which focuses on cooperatives as fake,  
destined to fail, or a means towards further degradation of peasant livelihoods, is to 
undermine the widespread cooperative experiment and the efforts of scholars and 
policymakers advocating for some form of cooperative organization as a possibility going 
forward. Indeed, the question of what counts as genuine is problematic itself. As cooperative 
activist Liu Laoshi observed, a cooperative of small farms organized by an experienced large 
household which offers planting advice and knowhow, purchases produce above market rates, 
but does not  distribute post-sale dividends, would be considered fake under China's 
Cooperative Law, although the distinction may simply be one of book-keeping.104 Looking 
beyond this question, we should shift our focus to the site-specific experiments continuing to 
emerge, to explore future possibilities and examine the practical challenges that arise from an 
organizational form that must perpetually navigate between its social imperative and the 
capitalist relations within which it is embedded.105 That is, to ask prescriptive, as opposed to 
descriptive, questions.106 
  Indeed, it seems the central government may be injecting renewed vigor into the 
cooperative experiment, as evidenced by the recent case of Tangyue village. A remote village 
in Zhejiang Province, Tangyue has a population of 3300. Of these, 1400 are able-bodied 
laborers of which, at peak times, 1100 would leave to find off-farm employment, leaving 
thirty per cent of the agricultural land uncultivated. Average annual income per person was 
4000 RMB, and several households were in poverty. Tangyue experienced severe flooding 
following storms in 2014. At the direction of the municipal Party Secretary, the village Party 
branch dispensed with the Household Responsibility System and reorganized the village on a 
cooperative basis. Within two years, many of the migrated villagers had returned, income per 
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villager had doubled, and no household remained in poverty.107 The case gained the public 
approval of Politburo Standing Committee member Yu Zhengsheng. Tangyue's story was 
recounted in “The Tangyue Road” (Tangyue Daolu), a book published by the state press 
agency Renmin Chubanshe, and launched with a high profile symposium at the National 
People's Congress in December 2016.108 This case  has been widely studied and debated by 
scholars and policymakers since then, apparently signifying a renewed focus within at least 
certain government circles on the potential role of cooperatives in China's development.109 
Indeed, the timing of this state-backed publicity drive, coinciding with the anticipated decline 
of agribusiness in the Northeast corn belt, may be no coincidence.  
 
Conclusion 
 
I have examined the current debates in China on agricultural land and production 
organization, focusing on discussions on agribusinesses, family farms, and cooperatives. In 
doing so, I engage with an emerging perspective in English language publications on the 
question of China's agrarian change. This collectively portrays transformations in China's 
countryside in terms of multiple processes of depeasantization, driven by the entry of big 
capital into the countryside, mostly agribusinesses but also urban capital connected to real 
estate, supported in various ways by pro-capital, scale-biased central government policies, 
and the activities of local officials. This picture is compelling as it corresponds to Eurocentric 
assumptions about the disappearance of the peasantry with the development of capitalism.  
 However, China's state policies are not governed by a single, coherent logic, and we 
should avoid drawing broader conclusions by extrapolating from a long-trusted paradigm.  I 
argue that this important body of work describes only part of the changes happening in  
China's countryside. The claim that the overarching goal of the state is depeasantization in the 
interests of promoting largescale farming, and agribusiness in particular, misses the 
continually contested nature of these questions in domestic policy circles obscures the 
ongoing and genuine efforts among central and local officials, as well as  politically engaged 
scholars, to promote forms of agricultural production conducive to the maintenance of rural 
producers' livelihoods. By examining these debates on “who will till the land” I highlight the 
opposite perspective, asking how policymakers attempt to  raise agricultural productivity 
while maintaining the livelihoods of a vast peasant population with a long future ahead of it. 
For the insights these debates provide into the thinking of policymakers, they warrant 
scholars' attention.    
 Indeed, to study China's agrarian change is to examine a fast moving target, and the 
urge to search for a recognizable “grand narrative” is best resisted. Some policymakers 
envisage China's rural future as a mixed picture of family farms, variably sized depending on 
regional terrain and local demographics, cooperatives in highly populated, poorer areas, and 
large-scale agribusinesses concentrated in the Northeast plains. The ongoing role of dragon-
heads in connecting family farms and cooperatives to larger markets appears little disputed, 
though the extent to which this will cause a degrading effect on producers' livelihoods 
remains a question for investigation.110 As Yu Huang reminded us in her study of the 
proletarianization of local aquaculture farmers, “we should refrain from a framework of 
linear determinism that dismisses the contradictions and resistance involved in the 
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process.”111 The new space which will undoubtedly open up for grassroots resistance, 
sometimes appearing in unexpected places, is one area to watch. Contestations of political 
thought and ideas, linked to varying economic interests and political concerns, fought within 
policy circles and shaped by changing circumstances on the ground, is another.  
 
Acknowledgments 
 
Many thanks to Chen Sheng, Du Lei, Gao Yuning, Hao Ren, Hu Angang, Hu Dongcai, Huang 
Jikun, Rebecca Karl, Li Chenggui, Lin Chun, Toby Lincoln, Pan Bin, Moss Roberts, Daniel 
Rossner, Sun Jin, Tian Peipei, Tian Xinsheng, Tong Zhihui, Wang Qizhen, Wang Yahua, Wen 
Tiejun, Yang Zhusong, Zang Liangzhen, Ellen Zhang, Zhang Junna, Zhang Yangyang, Zhang 
Yinghong, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. 
 
 
About the Author 
Jane Hayward is a research fellow from the United Kingdom working on contemporary and 
reform-era China – in particular, the processes by which China's state and society are 
becoming increasingly integrated into the global capitalist economy, and what this means for 
Chinese people. Her work focuses on the politics of China's peasant question, as well as 
related questions of urbanization, and processes of policymaking more generally. 
 
 
References 
Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon. 2007. “Land, Markets and Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian 
Political Economy Perspective.” Third World Quarterly 28 (8):1437–1456.  
 
Akram-Lodhi, A. Haroon, Cristóbal Kay and Saturnino M. Borras, Jr. 2009. “The Political 
Economy of Land and the Agrarian Question in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization.” In 
Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation and the Agrarian 
Question, edited by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristóbel Kay, 214–38. Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Andreas, Joel and Shaohua Zhan. 2016. “Hukou and Land: Market Reform and Rural 
Displacement in China.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 43 (4): 798–827. 
 
Araghi, Farshad. 2001. “The Great Global Enclosure of Our Times: Peasants and the Agrarian 
Question at the End of the Twentieth Century.” In Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness Threat 
to Farmers, Food and the Environment, edited by Fred Magdoff, Frederick H. Buttel and 
John Bellamy Foster, 145–160. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Araghi, Farshad. 2009. “The Invisible Hand and the Visible Foot: Peasants, Dispossession 
and Globalization.” In Peasants and Globalization: Political Economy, Rural Transformation 
and the Agrarian Question, edited by A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi and Cristóbel Kay, 111–147. 
Oxon: Routledge. 
                                                 
111Huang 2015, 409. 
18 
 
 
Cammack, Paul. 2002. “Attacking the Poor.” New Left Review 13: 125–134. 
 
China Daily. 2007. “Arable Land bank Continues to Decline.” April 13, 2007. Accessed June 
8, 2017: http://www.china.org.cn/english/GS-e/207075.htm  
 
Chuang, Julia. 2014. “China's Rural Land Politics: Bureaucratic Absorption and the Muting 
of Rightful Resistance.” The China Quarterly 219: 649–669. 
 
Day, Alexander. 2008. “The End of the Peasant? New Rural Reconstruction in China.” 
Boundary 2 35 (2): 49–73. 
 
Economist, The. 2007. “China's Next Revolution.” March 8, 2007. Accessed February 14, 
2016: http://www.economist.com/node/8815075. 
 
Economist, The. 2008a. “Promises, Promises: A “Breakthrough” in Land Reform? Or a Damp 
Squib?” October 16, 2008. Accessed February 14, 2016: 
http://www.economist.com/node/12437707. 
 
Economist, The. 2008b. “Still Not to the Tiller.” October 25, 2008. Accessed February 14, 
2016: http://www.economist.com/node/12471124. 
 
Erickson, Luke. 2008. “Land from the Tiller: The Push for Rural Land Privatization in 
China.” China Left Review 1.  
 
Fang, Ning. 2016. “Quanguo Nongmin Hezuoshe Zongshu Da 153.1 Wan Jia 42% Nonghu 
Ru Heshe” [The National Number of Peasant Cooperatives has Reached 1.531 Million – 42% 
of Rural Households have Entered a Cooperative]. Nongmin Ribao [Farmers' Daily]. March 
21, 2016. 
 
Feng, Haifa. 2001. “Lun Wo Guo Nongcun Chengzhenhua yu Nongye de Xietiao Fazhan” 
[On the Coordinated Development of Urbanization and Agriculture in China]. Xuexi yu 
Tansuo [Study and Exploration] 4: 88-93. 
 
Ford, Peter. 2007. “China’s Great Leap Forward on Property.” The Christian Science 
Monitor, March 15, 2007. Accessed February 12, 2016: 
https://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0315/p01s04-woap.html   
 
Gao, Yuncai. 2016. “Liuzhuan Mianji Chao Chengbao Gengdi Zong Mianji 1/3” [Transferred 
Land Area has Surpassed 1/3 of Total Contract Land]. Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 
November 20, 2016.  
 
Gao, Mobo. 2017. “Whither Rural China? A Case Study of Gao Village.” The China 
Quarterly 229: 23–43. 
 
Gong, Weigang and Qian Forrest Zhang. 2017. “Betting on the Big: State-brokered Land 
Transfers, Large-scale Agricultural Producers, and Rural Policy Implementation.” The China 
Journal 77: 1–26. 
 
Gongchan Dangyuan [Communist Party Member] 2010. “Gongshang Ziben Xiaxiang Hou 
19 
 
Nongmin Cong Yezhu Tuibian Cheng Gugong” [Industrial-commercial Capital's Entry into 
the Countryside will Degrade the Peasantry from Proprietors into Hired Laborers] 17: 33. 
 
Hale, Matthew A. 2013. “Tilling Sand: Contradictions of “Social Economy” in a Chinese 
Movement for Alternative Rural Development.” Dialectical Anthropology 37: 51–82. 
 
Han, Jun. 2012. “Zai Jiating Jingying Jichu Shang Tuijin Nongye Xiandaihua” [Advance 
Agricultural Modernization on the Basis of Household Management]. Renmin Ribao 
[People's Daily] January 18, 2012. 
 
Hancock, Tom. 2017. “China Drive to Relocate Millions of Rural Poor Runs into Trouble.” 
Financial Times, June 12, 2017. 
 
He, Ping. 2017. “Tangyue Daolu: Zhongguo Nongcun Xiwang Suozai” [Tangyue Road: Rural 
China's Hope]. Dongfang Toutiao [Eastern Headline], April 13, 2017. Accessed June 10, 
2017: https://mini.eastday.com/a/170413111057432.html  
 
He, Xuefeng. 2013. “Tudi Liuzhuan he Ziben Xiaxiang Bibing Congsheng” [The Harmful 
Effects of Land Transfer and Capital Going into the Countryside are Becoming Apparent]. 
Wuyouzhixiang [Utopia]. October 31, 2013. Accessed August 7, 2015: 
http://www.wyzxwk.com/e/DoPrint/index.php?classid=24&id=308176  
 
Ho, Peter. 2013. “In Defense of Endogenous, Spontaneously Ordered Development: 
Institutional Functionalism and Chinese Property Rights.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 40 
(6): 1087–1118. 
 
Hu, Zhanping, Qian Forrest Zhang and John A. Donaldson. 2017. “Farmers' Cooperatives in 
China: A Typology of Fraud and Failure.” The China Journal 78: 1–24. 
 
Huang, Jikun. 2017. “Farm Size Transformation and Mechanization.” Paper presented at the 
World Food Policy Conference. Bangkok, January 17, 2017. 
 
Huang, Jikun and Guolei Yang. 2017. “Understanding Recent Challenges and New Food 
Policy in China.” Global Food Security 12: 119–26.  
 
Huang, Philip C. C. 2011. “China's New-Age Small Farms and Their Vertical Integration: 
Agribusiness or Co-ops?” Modern China 37 (2): 107–134. 
 
Huang, Philip C. C., Gao Yuan and Yusheng Peng. 2012. “Capitalization without 
Proletarianization in China's Agricultural Development.” Modern China 38 (2): 139–173. 
 
Huang, Yu. 2015. “Can Capitalist Farms Defeat Family Farms? The Dynamics of Capital 
Accumulation in Shrimp Aquaculture in South China.” Journal of Agrarian Change 15 (3): 
392–414. 
 
Ji, Xianqing, Scott Rozelle, Jikun Huang, Linxiu Zhang, Tonglong Zhang. 2016. “Are China's 
Farms Growing?” China & World Economy 24 (1): 41–62. 
 
Jinrong Jie [Finance World]. 2008. “Zhongyang Nongcun Gongzuo Lingdao Xiaozu 
Banzhuren Chen Xiwen Shiyi Tudi Xinzheng” [Leader of the Central Committee Leading 
20 
 
Small Group for Rural Work Chen Xiwen Explains the New Land Policy]. November 7, 
2008. Accessed August 20, 2015: 
http://finance.jrj.com.cn/people/2008/11/0720192637752.shtml  
 
Krishna, Anirudh. 2004. “Escaping Poverty and Becoming Poor: Who Gains, Who Loses, and 
Why?” World Development 32: 121–136. 
 
Li, Changping. 2003. “The Crisis in the Countryside.” In One China, Many Paths, edited by 
Wang Chaohua, 198–218. London and New York: Verso. 
 
Li, Changping. 2008. “Zhongguo Nongcun Feilvbin Daoluhua de Weixian – Cong “Yazhou 
Dianfan” dao “Yazhou Bingfu” de Jiaoxun” [The Danger of China taking the Philippines’ 
Road – From “Asian Model” to “Sick Man of Asia”] Lv Ye [Green Leaf] 10: 100–105.  
 
Li, Cheng. 2009. “Hu Jintao’s Land Reform: Ambition, Ambiguity, and Anxiety.” China 
Leadership Monitor 27:1–22. Accessed February 14, 2016: 
http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/CLM27CL.pdf  
 
Li, Shaofei. 2013. “Daguimo Ziben Jinru Nongye Sunhai Nongmin Liyi” [Large-scale 
Capital's Entry into the Countryside will Harm Peasants' Interests]. Liaowang [Outlook]. 
September 2, 2013. 
 
Lin, Chun. 2015. “The Language of Class in China.” Socialist Register 51: 24–53. 
 
Lin, Yifu. 2004. “Rushi yu Zhongguo Liangshi Anquan he Nongcun Fazhan” [WTO Entry, 
China's Food Security and Rural Development]. Nongye Jingji Wenti [Problems in 
Agricultural Economy] 1: 32–3. 
 
Liu, Laoshi. 2010. “Cooperatives in Practice and the Localized Standards of Evaluation” 
[Hezuoshe Shijian yu Bentu Pingjia Biaozhun]. Kaifang Shidai [Open Times] 12: 53–67. 
 
Lu, Chan and Li Xiaomai. 2015. “Geng Hao Xiyin Gongshang Ziben Jinru Nongye Cujin 
Xiandai Nongye Fazhan – Zhuanfang Nongyebu Nongcun Jingji Tizhi yu Jingying Guanli Si 
Sizhang Zhang Hongyu” [How to Better Attract Industrial and Commercial Capital into the 
Countryside to Accelerate the Development of Modern Agriculture – An Interview with 
Zhang Hongyu, the Head of the Rural Economic Structure and Enterprise Management 
Department of the Ministry of Agriculture]. Lingdao Wencui [Leadership Digest] 12: 7–22. 
 
Luo, Qiangqiang, Joel Andreas and Yao Li. 2017. “Grapes of Wrath: Twisting Arms to Get 
Villagers to Cooperate with Agribusiness in China.” The China Journal 77: 27–50. 
 
Marx, Karl. 1937 [1851–2]. Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. Moscow: Progress 
Publishers. Accessed August 8, 2015: 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/18th-Brumaire.pdf 
 
McMichael, Philip. 1997. “Rethinking Globalization: The Agrarian Question Revisited.” 
Review of International Political Economy 4 (4): 630–662. 
 
Niu, Ruofeng. 2002. “Zhongguo Nongye Chanyehua Jingying de Fazhan Tedian yu 
Fangxiang” [Development Characteristics and Directions in Agricultural Industrialization in 
21 
 
China]. Zhongguo Nongye Jingji 5: 4–8.  
 
Ploeg, Jan Douwe van der, Jingzhong Ye and Lu Pan. 2014. “Peasants, Time and the Land: 
The Social Organization of Farming in China.” Journal of Rural Studies 36: 172–181. 
 
Ploeg, Jan Douwe van der and Ye Jingzhong. 2016. “The Conundrum of Chinese 
Agriculture.” In China's Peasant Agriculture and Rural Society: Changing Paradigms of 
Farming, edited by Jan Douwe van der Ploeg and Ye Jingzhong, 1-24. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
 
Post, Charles. 2008. “Comment: Primitive Accumulation in Modern China.” Dialectical 
Anthropology 32: 321–5. 
 
[PRC] Central Government of the People's Republic of China. 2008. “Zhongguo Zhongyang 
Guanyu Tuijin Nongcun Gaige Fazhan Ruogan Zhongda Wenti de Jueding” [Resolution by 
the Central Government of the People's Republic of China on Some Major Issues in Rural 
Reform and Development]. Policy document released at Third Plenary Session, October 12, 
2008. Accessed March 4, 2016: http://www.gov.cn/test/2008-10/31/content_1136796.htm 
Prosterman, Roy L. 2003. “China's New Market in Land.” Wall Street Journal March 7. 
Accessed March 7, 2016: https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1046988545851053680. 
 
Pun, Ngai and Lu Huilin. 2010. “Unfinished Proletarianization: Self, Anger, and Class Action 
among the Second Generation of Peasant-workers in Present-day China.” Modern China 36 
(5): 493–519. 
 
Qin, Hui. 2003. “Dividing the Big Family Assets.” New Left Review 20: 83–110. 
 
Qin, Qiming. 1981. “Baochandaohu de Xin Fazhan” [The New Developments of the 
Household Responsibility System]. In Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian [China Agricultural 
Yearbook], edited by Luo Hanxian, 79–81. Zhongguo Nongye Chubanshe [China Agriculture 
Press]: Beijing. 
 
Saich, Tony. 2007. “China in 2006: Focus on Social Development.”Asian Survey 47 (1): 32–
43. 
 
Sargeson, Sally. 2013. “Violence as Development: Land Expropriation and China's 
Urbanization.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 40 (6): 1063–85. 
 
Schneider, Mindi. 2017. “Dragon Head Enterprises and the State of Agribusiness in China.” 
Journal of Agrarian Change 17 (1): 3–21. 
 
Smith, Richard and Nancy Holmstrom. 2000. “The Necessity of Gangster Capitalism: 
Primitive Accumulation in Russia and China.” Monthly Review 51 (9): 1–15. 
 
Stanway, David. 2016. “China Corn Reserves Eyed as Crop Area to Fall for First Time in 13 
Years.” Reuters, May 5, 2016. Accessed June 7, 2017: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-grains-corn-idUSKCN0XW0BR. 
 
State Council 2012. “Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiakuai Fazhan 
22 
 
Xiandaihua Nongye Jinyibu Zengqiang Nongcun Fazhan Huoli de Ruogan Yijian” [Several 
proposals by the State Council of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 
Regarding the Speeding Up of Development and Modernization of Agriculture and Further 
Strengthening the Vitality of Rural Development]. Ministry of Agriculture, December 31, 
2012. Accessed August 4, 2015: 
http://www.moa.gov.cn/ztzl/yhwj2013/zywj/201302/t20130201_3213480.htm 
 
Wang Weiguo, Shi Xisheng, Wen Yibing. 2013. “Chen Xiwen: Fazhan Jiating Nongchang Bu 
Neng Yinggan Nongmin Zou” [Chen Xiwen: Developing Family Farms Cannot Drive Out 
the Peasants]. Nanfang Dushi Bao [Southern Metropolis Daily], June 11, 2013.  
 
Wang, Xiuzhong. 2010. “Cong San Zhong Moshi de Bijiao Kan Wo Guo Nongye Chanyehua 
Jingying Moshi de Xuanze” [Our Country’s Chosen Model of Agricultural Industrialization – 
A Comparison with Three Models]. Nongchanpin Jiagong Chuangxin Ban [Innovational 
Edition of Farm Products Processing] 9 (221): 3–4. 
 
Webber, Michael. 2008. “Primitive Accumulation in Modern China.” Dialectical 
Anthropology 32: 299–320. 
 
Wen, Jiabao. 2000. “Nuli Tigao Wo Guo Nongye Chanyehua Jingying Shuiping” [Work hard 
to raise the level of our country’s agricultural industrialization]. Renmin Ribao [People’s 
Daily], November 27, 2000. 
 
Wen, Tiejun. 1999. “Zhongmei Nongye Hezuo Xieyi Dui Zhongguo Nongye de Yingxiang” 
[The Impact of the Agreement on US-China Agricultural Cooperation]. Guoji Jingji Pinglun 
[International Economic Review] Z3: 5–6. 
 
Wen, Tiejun. 2007. “Deconstructing Modernization.” Chinese Sociology and Anthropology 
39 (4): 10–25. 
 
Wilson, Jeff. 2016. “U.S. Files WTO Case Against Chinese Agriculture Subsidies.” 
Bloomberg, September 13, 2016. Accessed June 8, 2017: 
http//:www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-13/u-s-files-wto-trade-case-against-
chinese-agricultural-subsidies 
 
Wong, Edward. 2008. “China may let Peasants Sell Rights to Farmland.” New York Times 
October 10, 2008.  
 
Yan, Hairong and Chen Yiyuan. 2013. “Debating the Rural Cooperative Movement in China, 
the Past and the Present.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 40 (6): 955–81. 
 
Yan, Hairong and Chen Yiyuan. 2015. “Agrarian Capitalization without Capitalism? 
Capitalist Dynamics from Above and Below in China.” Journal of Agrarian Change 15 (3): 
366–91.  
 
Yan, Hairong, Chen Yiyuan and Ku Hok Bun. 2016. “China's Soybean Crisis: The Logic of 
Modernization and its Discontents.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 43 (2): 373–395. 
 
Ye, Jingzhong. 2015. “Land Transfer and the Pursuit of Agricultural Modernization in 
China.” Journal of Agrarian Change 15 (3): 314–37. 
23 
 
 
Ye, Jingzhong. 2016. “Introduction: The Issue of Left-behind Elderly People in the Context 
of China’s Modernization.” Journal of Peasant Studies 
doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1186651, 1–8.  
 
Yu Meng. 2011. “Guotu Ziyuan Bu Jinji Tongzhi Yaoqiu Yanjin Qiye Weifa Xiaxiang 
Quandi” [The Ministry of Land and Resources Urgently Demands that Enterprises Entering 
the Countryside and Illegally Enclosing the Land is Prohibited]. Renmin Ribao [People's 
Daily], December 2, 2011. Accessed March 2, 2016: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1024/16468698.html.  
 
Yuan, Zi-kun. 2016. “Jiating Nongchang Shidu Guimo Yanjiu Zongshu” [A Survey on the 
Appropriate Scale of Family Farms]. Anhui Nongye Kexue [Journal of Anhui Agricultural 
Science] 44 (3): 263–4, 277. 
 
Zhan, Shaohua. 2017. “Hukou Reform and Land Politics in China: The Rise of a Tripartite 
Alliance.” The China Journal 78: 25–49. 
 
Zhang, Junna. 2017. “Waibu Ziyuan Daoxiang, Jiti Xingdong Nengli yu Hezuoshe Yipinxing 
de Jingying Jili Yanjiu – Jiyu 8 Jia Nongmin Hezuoshe de Duo Anli Fenxi” [A Study of 
External Resource Orientation, Collective Action, Pro-poor and Elite Mobilization in Peasant 
Cooperatives – A Multi-case Study Based on Eight Peasant Cooperatives]. PhD thesis. 
Beijing: Renmin University. 
 
Zhang, Qian Forrest and John Donaldson. 2008. “The Rise of Agrarian Capitalism with 
Chinese Characteristics: Agricultural Modernization, Agribusiness and Collective Land 
Rights.” The China Journal 60: 25–47. 
 
Zhang, Qian Forrest and John A. Donaldson. 2013. “China’s Agrarian Reform and the 
Privatization of Land: A Contrarian View.” Journal of Contemporary China 22 (80): 255–
272. 
 
Zhang, Qian Forrest, Carlos Oya and Jingzhong Ye. 2015. “Bringing Agriculture Back In: 
The Central Place of Agrarian Change in Rural China Studies.” Journal of Agrarian Change 
15 (3): 299–313.   
 
Zhang, Qin. 2013. “Nongyeyuan Bian Bieshu Qu: Kaifa Shang yu Bu Shouji Ganbu Jiecheng 
Liyi Lianmeng” [Agricultural Park Changed to Villa Zone: Alliance of Interests Formed 
Between Real-estate Developers and Unscrupulous Officials]. Liaowang [Outlook]. April 1, 
2013. 
 
Zhang, Yunhua. 2016. “Family Farm is the Major Mode for Agricultural Management – 
International Experience of Developing Family Farms and Relevant Implications for China.” 
Research Department of Rural Economy, Development Research Center of the State Council. 
Research Report no. 20. March 14, 2016. Accessed July 2, 2017: 
www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/drc/2016-04/18/content_24626454.htm  
 
Zhang, Zhenguo. 2000. “Guowai Nongye Chanyehua Fazhan de Moshi” [Foreign Models of 
Agricultural Industrialization]. Nongcun, Nongye, Nongmin [Countryside, Agriculture, 
Peasantry] 3: 39. 
24 
 
 
Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [China Securities Journal]. 2014. “Wen Tiejun: Jianshe 
Zonghexing Hezuoshe Tuijin Nongye Sanchanhua” [Wen Tiejun: Constructing 
Comprehensive Cooperatives – Advancing Agricultural Tertiary Industrialization]. December 
15, 2014. Accessed February 18, 2016: 
http://www.cs.com.cn/xwzx/hg/201412/t20141215_4589562.html  
 
Zhou, Jianming. 2017. “Cong Tangyue Hezuohua Xin Shijian Kan Mao Ze Dong Hezuohua 
Sixiang he Deng Xiaoping Di Er Ge Feiyue Sixiang de Zhidao Yiyi” [Understanding the 
Meaning of Mao Zedong's Cooperative Thought and Deng Xiaoping's Second Leap from the 
New Practice of Tangyue Cooperative]. Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu [Mao 
Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theory] 1: 52–6.  
 
Zhou, Zhong-li and Xia Ying. 2014. “Guowai “Jiating Nongchang” Fazhan Tanxi” [Analysis 
on the Development of Foreign Countries’ “Family Farms”] Guangdong Nongye Kexue 
[Guangdong Agricultural Science] 5: 22–5. 
 
Zhu, Keliang and Roy Prosterman. 2007. “Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A 
Leap Forward for Stability and Growth.” Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, 
Development Policy Analysis, CATO Institute. October 15. 3: 1–17. Accessed March 12, 
2016: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/DPA3.pdf  
 
Zhuang, Hongtao. 2013. “Quanguo Jiating Nongchang Da 87.7 Wan Ge: Pingjun Guimo 
Chaoguo 200 Mu” [National Number of Family Farms Reaches 877,000: Average Scale Over 
200 Mu]. Xinhua, June 4, 2013. Accessed June 14, 2017: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2013-06/04/c_116031511.htm  
 
 
 
 
